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Breathing Life into a Phenomenology of Illness, Part I
Havi Carel on understanding illness through its lived experience
The experience of illness is a universal and substantial part of human existence. Like death, illness
raises important philosophical issues. But unlike death, illness, and in particular the experience of
being ill, has received little philosophical attention. This may be because illness is often
understood as a physiological process that falls within the domain of medical science, and is thus
outside the purview of philosophy. In my new book, Phenomenology of Illness, I claim that the
experience of illness has been wrongly neglected by philosophers in general, philosophers of
science and medicine in particular, and by biomedical theory and practice. This philosophical and
biomedical neglect of the experience of illness stands in stark contrast to the intense interest in
this experience from the general public and from ill people and those who care for and about them.
In the book, I suggest that it is necessary to supplement a naturalistic account of disease (I use the
term ‘disease’ to denote physiological dysfunction) with a philosophical study of the experience of
illness (how the disease is experienced) itself. This approach aims to study illness without viewing
it exclusively as a subject of scientiﬁc investigation. It is not enough to see illness as an entity in
the world that can be studied with the tools of science. In order to fully understand illness, it also
has to be studied as a lived experience. To study the lived experience of illness is necessarily to
explore its existential, ethical, and social dimensions.
Hence I use a phenomenological approach for this study. Phenomenology—the philosophical
method for studying lived experience—is not a variant form of scientiﬁc enquiry, but a method for
examining pre-reﬂective, subjective, and pre-theorized human experience as it is lived, prior to its
theorization by science.
The aim of the book is twofold: to contribute to the understanding of illness through the use of
philosophy and to demonstrate the importance of illness for philosophy. This bilateral approach lies
at the heart of the book. I argue that a philosophical analysis is essential to developing a full
understanding of illness, and complements work in medical anthropology, sociology of health and
illness, health psychology, and qualitative health research.
Illness is a breathtakingly intense experience. It unsettles, and sometimes shatters, the most
fundamental values and beliefs we hold. It is physically and emotionally draining. It can be
physically and psychologically debilitating. Illness requires serious effort and continuous work to
adapt practically to its limitations and to adjust psychologically to the pain, restricted horizons, and
frustration it brings. It forces the ill person and those around her to confront mortality in its most
direct and bare manifestation. In all of these ways, illness requires labour, attention, and a
conscious and sustained effort.
But, as I argue in the book, illness is also existentially and intellectually demanding—and
potentially rewarding—in ways hitherto unexplored. Illness can challenge our most fundamental
beliefs, expectations, and values, and this accords it a distinct and important philosophical role.
For example, the belief that a longer life is better than a shorter life comes under intense scrutiny
when one is given a poor prognosis. Perhaps a shorter but more meaningful life is equally
valuable, or even better than a longer life? In what ways does the value of life depend on its
duration? These are some of the questions that may arise in response to illness.
Many ill people report a change in their perception of space and time. Places that were ‘just round
the corner’, things that were ‘easy to carry’, and events (like death) that were vaguely conceived
as ‘a long way off’ change their function and, as a result, also their meaning. For example, stairs
that once led somewhere are now merely an obstacle for the paraplegic. Not only the contents of
experience but also its structure and normative ﬁt change in illness; we need to study these
changes carefully.
In the most general terms, we can say that illness changes how the ill person experiences the
world and how she inhabits it. Such a dramatic and overarching change to experience deserves,
or often simply demands, philosophical attention. A common reaction to a diagnosis of illness is a
sense of meaninglessness and despair. Such an event challenges the ill person to reﬂect on her
life and search for ways of regaining its meaningfulness. As such, illness is one path leading to
philosophical reﬂection by calling us to question our understanding of the world, fundamental
beliefs, habits, and expectations. Illness often distances the ill person from her previous life and
constitutes a violent invitation—or, again, demand—to philosophize.
What kind of invitation to philosophize illness is, and what philosophical work can arise from this
invitation, are two major concerns of the book, which have so far garnered little attention from
philosophers. I offer an account of the philosophical productiveness of illness, but also of its violent
mode. Of course, the invitation to reﬂect on one’s life issued by illness can be met with resistance.
Many people, both healthy and ill, deny, ﬂee, or otherwise resist thinking about vulnerability,
morbidity, and mortality. This reaction stems from the difﬁcult nature of illness. Unwelcome and
demanding, it extends its bony ﬁngers to grab, restrict, and sometimes destroy all that we hold
dear: freedom, motility, agency, action, possibility, and the openness of the future. Perhaps
philosophers’ neglect of illness is one sort of such denial, or an attempted falsiﬁcation (in the
Nietzschean sense) of the realities of life through wilful, although often unconscious, blindness to
its uglier faces.
Contra this tendency to resist thinking about illness, I propose that illness is a philosophical tool.
Through its pathologizing effect, illness distances the ill person from taken-for-granted routines and
habits, and thus reveals aspects of human existence that normally go unnoticed. For example, I
claim that we have a tacit sense of bodily certainty that only comes to our attention when it is
disrupted and replaced by bodily doubt. As such, illness is a useful philosophical tool for shedding
light on the structure and meaning of human existence and experience.
What we have, therefore, is a bilateral ﬂow from philosophy to illness and back. Philosophy, and in
particular phenomenology, can be used to understand the experience of illness, and illness can be
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used to shed new light on central areas of philosophy such as ethics, political philosophy, and the
study of human experience. The idea that the illumination is mutual is a central theme of the book.
The central case study the book examines is the symptom of breathlessness. I analyse respiratory
illness and breathlessness, using the phenomenological account developed in the book. The
experience of breathlessness is acutely distressing, and yet it is also invisible and difﬁcult to both
measure and describe. It is invisible because respiratory patients are often housebound or have
limited mobility. This makes them less visible. But it is also invisible because the experience of
breathlessness can seem innocuous to the external observer. However, the experience of
breathlessness is pervasive, acute, and ill-understood. The book uses the phenomenological tools
developed in it to outline a phenomenology of breathlessness and to explore the discrepancy
between the subjective experience of breathlessness and the objective measurements of lung
function.
Breathlessness is not only a symptom; it is a constant horizon that frames the experience of a
respiratory patient. It is a limiting factor, and a condition of possibility for any action or experience
the ill person may have. It also has a rich symbolic and psychological meaning. Our ﬁrst and last
breath mark the beginning and end of life. A baby’s ﬁrst breath, noted by her cry, is a symbolic
moment of joining humanity, with a voice propelled outwards by her tiny lungs. It is the breath of
life. Here I am, she says. Hear me. Witness my efforts to exist and communicate. The last breath
is rasping, irregular, forced. Or it can be barely perceptible. It says: I am running out of breath,
which is a running out of life. And in between the ﬁrst inhalation and last exhalation lies all of life,
continuously rising and falling, inhaling the exterior and exhaling the unneeded, taking in and
letting out. This life can be lived within the horizon of normal breathing and breathlessness, but is
often lived in pathological breathlessness.
The richness of the experience of breathlessness and the way in which it differs from normal
breathing are currently studied in detail by the Life of Breath team. What is immediately striking is
how intimately entwined life and breath are, which makes breathing a juncture of the physiological,
psychological, existential, spiritual, and cultural. Thus breathlessness cannot be studied solely as
a symptom. In part two of this essay, I will offer a phenomenology of breathlessness that takes it to
be a transformative experience, much broader and more signiﬁcant than a medical symptom.
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